Every Query Counts: Analyzing the Privacy Loss of Exploratory Data
  Analyses by von Voigt, Saskia Nuñez et al.
Every Query Counts: Analyzing the Privacy Loss
of Exploratory Data Analyses
Saskia Nuñez von Voigt1, Mira Pauli2, Johanna Reichert2, and Florian
Tschorsch1
1 Distributed Security Infrastructure Group, Technische Universität Berlin,
Straße des 17. Juni 135, 10623 Berlin, Germany
{saskia.nunezvonvoigt,florian.tschorsch}@tu-berlin.de
2 anacision GmbH,
Albert-Nestler-Straße 19, 76131 Karlsruhe, Germany
{mira.pauli,johanna.reichert}@anacision.de
Abstract. An exploratory data analysis is an essential step for every
data analyst to gain insights, evaluate data quality and (if required)
select a machine learning model for further processing. While privacy-
preserving machine learning is on the rise, more often than not this initial
analysis is not counted towards the privacy budget. In this paper, we
quantify the privacy loss for basic statistical functions and highlight the
importance of taking it into account when calculating the privacy-loss
budget of a machine learning approach.
1 Introduction
One of the most prevalent barriers of machine learning involve data management
in general and information security and privacy in particular. This is especially
relevant for sensitive data sets that, for example, include medical and financial
data items. In order to overcome the barriers, the area of privacy-preserving
machine learning (PPML) gained attention [2,11]. It is concerned with providing
an infrastructure for secure and privacy-preserving data access as well as privacy-
preserving model generation.
While PPML reduces the risk of data leaks, particularly the risk of model
inversion attacks, one aspect is often overlooked: In order to decide which type
of model should be trained and how it should be parametrized, a data analyst
performs a preceding exploratory data analysis (EDA). The EDA consists of
querying the data for a number of statistics and metrics. The goal is to gain
insights on the data quality, as well as the relationships between the variables to
initiate data preprocessing before a model is created. To do so, the data analyst
has typically full data access and is not restricted in her queries.
In this paper, we evaluate the privacy loss of performing an EDA. To this end,
we assume that an analyst obtains differentially-private answers [4] to preserve
information privacy. We quantify the privacy loss for basic analysis steps, which
can be used to make decisions on how to clean the data, select features, and
to select a model. Based on our evaluation, we discuss the implications of the
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resulting privacy loss and conclude that an interactive EDA is not feasible in a
privacy-preserving setting.
At the same time, we compare the accuracy of an interactive approach with
the generation of differentially-private synthetic data. Our results underline that
the privacy loss can be mitigated by determining which functions are needed such
that they can be answered as correlated queries. The generation of synthetic
data is a generalization of this approach. Accordingly, we recommend to develop
standardized sets of EDA functions to reduce the privacy loss and/or increase
accuracy. In all cases, however, the privacy loss inevitably increases with the
amount of information requested and should be considered for EDAs in general.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 and Section 3, we describe our
system model and introduce a basic set of EDA functions, respectively. In Sec-
tion 4, we evaluate the privacy loss and discuss the feasibility of a differentially-
private interactive EDA, before concluding this paper in Section 5.
2 Background
2.1 System and Adversary Model
An EDA is typically performed before a machine learning model is created in
order to obtain a basic understanding of variable distributions, data quality, and
the relationship between variables. By querying this information, a data analyst
can determine the necessary steps for data cleaning and a suitable model.
In this paper, we consider the data analyst as an adversary, who should not be
able to reveal information about individuals. That is, we assume an interactive
query-response setting, which is visualized in Figure 1. The analyst (internal or
external) is allowed to query a data set and request aggregated data to perform
the EDA and afterwards train a model. In order to mitigate re-identification
attacks, noise is added to the results, which satisfy the definition of differential
privacy (see below). A privacy budget tracks the privacy loss generated by the
queries. It decreases with each query until it is spent and no further queries are
answered. The system model captures the privacy-utility trade-off inherent to
the notion of information privacy. We believe that the requirement of an EDA
is often overlooked when it comes to creating privacy-preserving models.
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2.2 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy quantifies the privacy loss [4] regardless of an adversary’s
knowledge. It determines the risk of being identified in a database by comparing
results of querying the database with and without the individual concerned. The
intuition is that the absence/existence of a data subject should have a small
impact on the results, which in turn implies that an adversary cannot identify
individuals from the result. More formally, a mechanism K provides -differential
privacy if for all data sets D1 and D2, differing on at most one data subject, and
all S ⊆ Range(K) satisfy
P [K(D1) ∈ S] ≤ e · P [K(D2) ∈ S]. (1)
Differential privacy ensures that the result of an analysis changes by at most
a multiplicative factor e when a record is included in the data set or not. For
 = 0, the result of an analysis is exactly the same whether a record is included
or not and thus provides perfect privacy. With  = 0, however, we cannot obtain
meaningful results. In contrast, higher  provide lower privacy guarantee. It is
therefore necessary to find a balance between  and the accuracy of the results.
Any mechanism guaranteeing differential privacy is robust under composi-
tion [10]. If we apply the mechanisms Ki, each providing i-differential privacy,
several times to the same data, the sequence of queries gives -differential pri-
vacy with  =
∑
i i. In other words, the maximum privacy loss is bounded by
the privacy budget , which in turn is reduced by i for each query. As soon as
the budget is spent, no further queries are answered. The parallel application of
mechanisms Ki for Di, an arbitrary disjoint subset of the input domain D, each
providing i-differential privacy, gives  -differential privacy with  = max(i).
In an EDA, a data analyst queries interactively, i.e., we assume random
queries that are unknown in advance. Therefore, we apply the differential privacy
mechanism for each query and calculate the required privacy budget  according
the composition theorems.
To satisfy differential privacy for numeric queries, commonly random noise
drawn from a Laplace distribution is added to the numerical output f(X) [4].
The magnitude of noise is calibrated according to the sensitivity of a function.
The sensitivity ∆f is the maximum difference that an output can change by
removing or adding a record. For example, a simple counting query, i.e., how
many rows have a specific variable value, has ∆f = 1. Differential privacy is
then provided by f(X) + Lap(∆f / ).
3 Exploratory Data Analysis
An EDA is an essential step in any data science application. Generally, an EDA
includes different methods and can be an exhaustive analysis within itself. More-
over, the process is not standardized and depends on the objective of the analysis.
In the following, we select some basic statistical functions that serve as the
“least common denominator”, which we derived from literature as well as our
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Table 1: Privacy loss for statistical functions of a basic EDA.
Statistical function
Information Numerical (NUM) Categorical (CAT) Privacy loss
distribution (DIST) range, Q1, Q2, Q3 value counts i · (5 · n+ c)
missing values (MISS) count value counts i · n
outliers (OUTL) count outside cut-off value counts i · n
correlation (CORR) Spearman’s correlation Cramer’s V i ·
((
n
2
)
+
(
c
2
))
own practice in the field. The selected statistical functions for this basic EDA
are listed in Table 1. Even if we limit our EDA to certain functions, we still
assume that the queries performed by the analyst are not known in advance
and are sent interactively depending on the results. Since some analyses depend
on the data type, we differentiate functions between categorical and numerical
variables.
Distribution. The distribution of the data is important to understand the data.
For numerical variables, the range and quantiles provide information about the
validity of the data and a sense of the range of the data. For categorical vari-
ables, a data analyst retrieves the unique variable values, especially the number
of observations of each variable value. Variables with a discrete uniform distri-
bution, for example, are not suitable to identify meaningful patterns. Variables
that show this behavior need to be cleaned or removed for the training process.
Missing Values. The number of missing values indicates whether steps for data
cleaning are necessary. There are different options such as case deletions or im-
putation with a vast body of literature discussing these options and their impli-
cations for later analysis steps [1].
Outliers. Machine learning models can be influenced by outliers, thus an analyst
should be aware of their presence in the data set. There are many sophisticated
tools to detect outliers, that mostly come with a high degree of privacy loss.
Therefore, we resort to a simple box plot approach, where the cutoff point for
outliers is defined as the upper and lower quantiles (Q1 and Q3) and a tolerance
of 1.5 · (Q3−Q1) [6]. We then count all values that lie above or below that cutoff
point. In this univariate outlier detection context, categorical variables are not
covered, as rare values have already become visible from the distribution.
Correlation. The results of the correlation between variables mainly contribute
to feature selection, where certain variables may be excluded from the model
or combined with each other. Correlated variables are problematic for the in-
terpretation of a model [14]. Furthermore, the relationship between independent
variables may imply that dimensionality reduction methods can be applied to
the data set to improve model performance. Based on this motivation, we in-
clude Spearman’s correlation matrix for numerical data and a Cramer’s V for
categorical variables in our basic set of EDA functions.
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Fig. 2: Cumulative privacy loss with i = 0.01 for different datasets.
4 Privacy loss and Accuracy Impact Assessment
In Table 1, we quantify the privacy loss of the functions of our basic EDA. The
privacy budget required to compute the respective functions is cumulated by
the privacy loss of each query. It depends on the privacy loss per query i, the
number of categorical variables c, and the number of numerical variables n.
For the numerical distribution a data analyst queries the min, max, Q1, Q2,
and Q3. In other words, to obtain the information an analyst needs to query
the data five times. Since each record is contained in each variable, an analyst
spends 5 · i ·n of its privacy budget for this statistical function. The categorical
distribution can be investigated by the counts per variable value that are queried
only once per variable and the required budget increases by i and c.
The missing values as well as the outliers of categorical variables are visi-
ble from the value counts. Therefore, the privacy budget only increases by the
numerical variables for both the missing values and the outliers.
We quantify the relationship between two variables using Spearman’s correla-
tion for numerical and Cramer’s V for categorical variables. Since both measures
are symmetrical, the privacy budget increases by the number of permutations
4.1 Privacy Loss
We determine the privacy budget for some data sets from the UCI Machine
Learning Repository3. The data sets differ in size and number of variables. Com-
mon values for  comprise 0.01, 0.1, 1, ln(2), or ln(3) [5]. Therefore we fixed the
privacy guarantee for each query to i = 0.01, as this is the smallest value.
3 http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml
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Figure 2 shows the cumulative privacy loss by conducting all statistical func-
tions from our basic EDA. We observe an increasing and high privacy loss. For
computing all functions, the adult data set requires the smallest privacy bud-
get. The prime cause of this difference is the small number of variables in total.
Indeed, the magic04 data set has less variables in total but more numerical
variables. Since an analyst sends an additional query for numerical variables to
determine the missing values or outliers, the privacy loss increases and is thus
higher than for categorical variables.
The correlation leads to the highest privacy loss, since the budget increases
by the binomial coefficient
(
n
2
)
and
(
c
2
)
.
Note that the privacy budget increases linearly with the number of queries.
With a lower privacy guarantee, i.e., i > 0.01, the total privacy budget would
exceed the privacy budget of  = 3, which yields a 20 times higher chance (e3) to
be compromised. With a smaller i, we can reduce the privacy loss and therefore
the total required privacy budget. However, this leads to an accuracy loss.
4.2 Accuracy
Due to the order of queried information the answers of our queries cannot be
re-used. In order to reduce the privacy budget, numerous approaches aggregate
queries and determine correlations between queries [7–9, 12, 13]. This allows es-
timating results from other noisy answers without spending its privacy budget.
The results of these mechanisms can also be treated as differentially-private
synthetic data that support the original working method of a data analyst.
In this section, we evaluate the accuracy of a differentially-private EDA and
compare the interactive setting with differentially-private synthetic data sets.
For data sets with numeric variables, we remove some values from a variable to
have a numerical variable with 10% missing values.
We generate synthetic data sets using the correlated mode of DataSynthe-
sizer4 that learns a Bayesian network with a degree of four. For comparison,
we generate synthetic data with the same privacy budget that is required to
investigate the correlation in an interactive setting. For example for the adult
synthetic data set we set  = 51 · 0.01 = 0.51.
We measure the accuracy of our basic EDA using the relative error of each
query. Figure 3 reports the relative error for each statistical function visualized as
box plot containing the relative error for each query. Overall, the synthetic data
sets have a smaller relative error compared to the interactive setting. However,
the relative error of the synthetic data sets for the numerical correlation is higher
compared to the interactive setting. For the data set magic04 (Figure 3c), we
observe a similar effect for the outliers. The high error occurs in the synthetic
data sets due to the high range of some numerical variables. Remarkably, we
obtain a high error for outliers for the interactive setting. This demonstrates
that the relative error for the variables varies.
4 Available for download at https://github.com/DataResponsibly/
DataSynthesizer
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Fig. 3: Accuracy of statistical functions given by the relative error.
4.3 Discussion
The results show that even basic investigations of an EDA require a high privacy
budget in an interactive setting. Therefore, an interactive analysis with both
acceptable accuracy and an acceptable privacy guarantee is not possible.
Non-interactive mechanisms, such as differentially-private synthetic data sets,
can be used to increase accuracy and/or reduce the privacy budget. Notably, the
synthetic data set can be used directly to train a model without dividing the
privacy budget among EDA and model generation. However, the expressiveness
of non-interactive mechanisms is limited to the correlations used for generating
the output. Therefore, these mechanisms are not applicable for an interactive
setting with random or unknown queries [3].
In an EDA, information is queried interactively, where one query depends on
the results of previous queries. Grouping or limiting the queries to certain statis-
tics, a differentially-private EDA might become feasible, though. We therefore
appeal to data analysts to agree on widely applicable statistics that show the
information necessary for model generation. With our basic EDA, we made a
first attempt to create such a collection of statistics. A standardized set of statis-
tical functions used in an EDA could be optimized to balance the privacy-utility
trade-off.
8 S. Nuñez von Voigt et al.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we demonstrate the increase of the privacy loss and thus the re-
quired budget for an interactive differentially-private analysis. We argue that
the EDA should be considered in privacy-preserving models, as it is an essential
step in machine learning. In order to address the privacy-utility trade-off, we
propose to agree on standardized sets of EDA functions and use the remaining
privacy budget for model creation.
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